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Achievement of Shojiro Ishibashi and related SDGs
Economy
Society
*Transformation of business domain
*Innovation in marketing methods
*Development of domestic tires
*Improve employees’ working conditions
*Support for educational institutions
*Operate museum
*Drive R & D
*Strict quality control
*Management based on appropriate profit
*Progress from family business




1. Early days 
Shojiro Ishibashi, Bridgestone Corporation's founder, was born in 1889 as the second son of 
Shimaya, who ran a tailoring shop in Kurume, Fukuoka Prefecture. When he was young, he was a 
sickly and unobtrusive child. In 1902, he entered Kurume Commercial School as the youngest student. 
At that time, there were only about 30 commercial schools nationwide and it was extremely difficult 
to be accepted (Ishibashi Shojiro Biography Publication Committee [1978], p.17). 
 When he was attending Kurume Commercial School, Shojiro met Koujiro Ishii, who later became 
the chairman of the House of Representatives, and Shigejiro Sakamoto, who later received the Order 
of Culture award from the government as a successful western painter. Shojiro deepened his 
knowledge of painting through exchanges with Sakamoto, and paintings he collected are renowned 
worldwide as the Ishibashi Collection. Also, Shojiro came to have a deep relation with politicians 
Ichiro Hatoyama and Shigeru Yoshida, both of whom became prime ministers after World War II. 
As a next step after graduation from the Kurume Commercial school, Shojiro hoped to go to the 
Kobe Higher Commercial School, but he could not get his father's permission. While watching his 
classmates go on to study, Shojiro felt bitterly disappointed. However, Shojiro was quick at changing 
his thinking. 
He decided to take over the family business and renewed his determination as " I want to create a 
business that develops nationwide and benefits society (Ibid., P. 29). 
 
2. From family business to full-scale business 
2.1 Transformation of business domain 
"Shimaya" had an inefficient business of producing various products after receiving orders. The 
first step in the management reform that Shojiro implemented was the restructuring of the business 
domain. 
Shojiro abolished order-made production of many varieties and concentrated his business on 
manufacturing and selling tabi (Japanese split-toed socks). In addition, he hired unpaid apprentices as 
paid employees to increase their motivation. Shojiro broke away from the cottage industry and pursued 
business innovation to establish a business that introduced modern management. 
In 1908, as the first step in mechanization, the company constructed a new factory, invested in 
equipment such as oil engines and power sewing machines, and hired 30 new workers.  
Before shifting to specialized tabi manufacturing, tabi production capacity was 280 pairs per day. 
However, after becoming a specialized tabi manufacturer, the number increased to 700 pairs per day 
(Bridgestone [1982], p.10).  
After that, Shojiro pursued his management reforms, focusing on (1) setting appropriate profits and 




Shojiro set the appropriate profit at 10% of sales, and decided on 
manufacturing costs and selling prices based on the appropriate profit. 
A price determination method widely used in companies is the cost 
addition method. In this method, a price is determined by adding a 
certain margin to direct and indirect costs. This method is expected to 
be stable from a corporate perspective. However, in a market where 
competition between companies is fierce, this method would be risky 
because customers may not accept the price calculated by the cost 
addition method. 
In those days, Kurume was crowded with competitors. Tsuchiya tabi (the predecessor of Moonstar 
Co., Ltd.), founded by Unpei Kurata, a pioneer tabi maker, had a large presence, and Fukusuke Tabi, 
a leading manufacturer of machine-stitched tabi based in the Kansai area, also entered the market. 
 Shojiro gained customer support by drastically reducing both costs and prices, and at the same time 
succeeded in balancing the difficult task of securing appropriate profits. 
 Shojiro developed a new branding strategy centered on trust and originality. Due to the nature of 
tabi (split-toed socks), in the summer when sales decreased, working capital was in short supply, and 
there was a great need for a bank loan. Shojiro’s Shimaya, which was a late entrant, had poor 
creditworthiness and had difficulty obtaining financing. Therefore, Shojiro succeeded in building a 
brand of trust by strictly observing the repayment date of the debt. His close relationship with financial 
institutions greatly helped his company to advance business innovation (Ishibashi Shojiro Biography 
Publication Committee [1978], p.34). 
 Shojiro devised creative advertising to build a corporate brand. In 1912, he rode a car for the first 
time in Tokyo. From that experience, he came up with an idea of advertising tabi using a car. He 
purchased a very expensive foreign-made open car, decorated it with fancy signs and banners, and 
toured the entire Kyushu area, advertising tabi. The power of this advertising car was enormous. 
Shojiro's bold advertising campaign was a huge success. 
Although Shojiro conducted an innovative advertising campaign based on novel ideas that attracted 
the public’s attention, he had a negative opinion of advertising that merely appealed to consumers to 
buy products.  With the belief that the products themselves were the best advertisements, once the 






(Source) Ishibashi [1978] p. 32
Table 1  Shimaya tabi sales
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improving quality and lowering prices instead. 
 
2.2 Product development and marketing strategy 
 In 1914, Shojiro launched a new product that overturned 
conventional wisdom in the industry. It was  "20-sen Asahi tabi" 
sold at a low set price1. At that time, tabi were priced according to 
type and size. In Shimaya, the production system was modernized and 
mechanized so mass production of high-quality products was possible. 
Shojiro improved complex distribution processes and focused on customer-oriented product 
development. Shojiro's strategy, which consistently expanded from manufacturing to sales, seems to 
have some underlying ideas with strategy of today’s UNIQLO which is gaining customer support by 
providing high quality classic casual clothing in low prices.2 
The responses from competitors for Ishibashi’s flat-price tabi were extremely cold. Rivals entered 
flat-price tabi two years after the launch of Asahi Tabi. However, Ishibashi’s strategy was a great 
success. Before the launch of Asahi Tabi, Shimaya’s sales was 600,000 pairs a year, but by 1918, it 
had grown to 3 million pairs a year (Bridgestone [1982], p.13). Asahi Tabi grabbed the customer's 
heart in terms of both quality and price, and swept the market. 
 In 1918, Shojiro established Nippon Tabi Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Nippon Tabi) with a 
capital of 1 million yen, and switched from a small family business to a more organized, larger business. 
In 1921, Nippon Tabi started to develop an advanced form of tabi called jika tabi. Jika tabi was made 
of durable cloth and a rubber plate was pasted on the sole so that it could be worn outdoors. At that 
time, ordinary workers used straw shoes (straw sandals). Shoes were not durable, and when workers 
put them on with bare feet, they were often injured by fragments or nails, so tabi was a necessity for 
workers. 
 
The price of the straw shoes was 5 sen per pair, and when added 
to the tabi fee, 1.50 yen per month (about 18 yen per year) needed 
to be spent on footwear. The average wage of workers at that time 
was around 1 yen per day, so the cost of footwear was not light. 
Tabi with rubber soles were not original of Japanese tabi. It was 
produced in the Kinki region around 1902. However, it was not 
widely spread because the rubber sole was easily peeled off. 
 After trial and error, Nippon Tabi technically overcame this 
shortcoming, and succeeded in commercializing Asahi jika tabi 
(split-toed heavy cloth shoes with rubber soles). The name "jika 
tabi" was an original trademark of Japanese Tabi, but it has become a common name. 
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At that time, the price of one pair of jika tabi was 1.50 yen. The useful life of a jika tabi was about 
half a year, so the annual cost of footwear using jika tabi was 3 yen. Compared to 18 yen per year for 
using the straw shoes, the cost was reduced to one sixth. Consumers were very pleased with the 
emergence of jika tabi which was both economical and safe. In January 1923, the production of jika 
tabi was 1,000 pairs per day, but in December in the same year, it increased dramatically to 10,000 
pairs per day (Bridgestone [1982], p.17).  
Nippon Tabi, which solidified its base with strong sales of jika tabi, started to produce rubber shoes 
in October 1923. With the spread of Western clothes, the mainstream of footwear was about to shift 
from clogs and sandals to shoes. Focusing on these changes, Nippon Tabi anticipated increased 
demand for inexpensive rubber shoes. Nippon Tabi’s anticipation turned out to be right; orders for 
rubber shoes surged from abroad, and the export of Japanese rubber shoes even caused international 
trade friction. 
Let's look back on the competition between companies in the age of tabi makers.  
In the first phase, homogenization (imitation / improvement) activities took place. The first mover 
was "Tsuchiya tabi ", a local maker in Kurume. Shojiro’s company, Shimaya, which was a follower, 
tried to homogenize the first mover by thoroughly imitating the innovative business of Tsuchiya tabi.  
In the second phase, differentiating actions were developed. The keyword here is price destruction. 
The first mover in the second phase was "Shimaya (Shojiro’s Nippon Tabi)", and followers were 
"Tsuchiya tabi" and other major manufacturers such as Fukusuke. 
Shimaya made a bold differentiation with the "20 sen priced Asahi Tabi". Tsuchiya tabi and other 
major manufacturers underestimated this and allowed Shimaya to run ahead of other rivals. Shimaya 
succeeded in gaining trust from consumers and retailers, and made a leap to become a top manufacturer 
in the industry. 
In the third phase, companies in the tabi industry returned to the homogenization competition again. 
The key word here was product innovation. the first mover in the third phase was Nippon Tabi again, 
and its followers were Tsuchiya tabi and other major manufacturers. Nippon Tabi became the top 
manufacturer in the second phase by developing a revolutionary product, jika tabi.  
However, poor counterfeit goods spread all over Japan, and lawsuits for patent infringement were 
filed frequently. Nippon Tabi allowed companies following the settlement to manufacture and sell jika 
tabi under the condition of royalty payments. As a result, many tabi manufacturers accelerated 
activities to imitate and improve jika tabi products of Nippon tabi. 
 
3. Challenge to “Made in Japan” tires 
3.1 Establishment of Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. 
Shojiro Ishibashi based his business management on the expansion of retained earnings and the 
development of new businesses using the funds. What made this possible was the "30% leap forward" 
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campaign which began in 1923 to aim at increasing production by 30% every year (Bridgestone [1982], 
p.17). In addition, the company maintained its policy of securing 10% of sales as appropriate profit, 
so if the company could increase production by 30% every year, internal reserves would expand 
exponentially. 
In a rapidly changing socio-economic environment, companies need to create new businesses based 
on their strengths (core technologies) in order to survive. Nippon Tabi linearly developed a new 
business such as jika tabi and shoe boots based on their technologies of tabi manufacturing and rubber 
processing. 
Ishibashi's next goal was to produce car tires that had not yet been domestically manufactured in 
Japan. This decision is often regarded as a challenge in a different field. From the perspective that the 
company was a footwear manufacturer, it would be evaluated as a challenge to a different field. It can 
be said that the business is expanding. However, if the company's core technology is regarded as rubber 
processing technology, the production of automotive tires can be said to be a natural  expansion of 
business utilizing the core technology. 
  In its development process, Nippon Tabi evolved its core technology into rubber processing 
technology. In other words, new technologies were added to the core technologies, and the two  
complemented each other to achieve growth. In addition, as seen in the export of rubber shoes, 
Ishibashi’s business philosophy of contributing to the country through the development of industry 
and the spirit of challenge brought him toward the domestic production of automobile tires. 
By the time Ishibashi decided to enter the tire business, it was 
about the time that the main products of the rubber industry in the 
US and Europe would shift to automotive tires. Ishibashi loved 
cars after  he bought them for advertising his tabi products . The 
number of vehicles owned in Japan increased dramatically from 
512 in 1912 to 40,070 passenger cars and 12,097 trucks in 1926 
(Ibid., P. 102). 
Only 595 domestic cars were produced in Japan from 1912 to 
1926, and automobile tires were dominated by imported goods. 
Dunlop Far East Co., Ltd., founded in 1913 by Dunlop, UK, began producing tires in Japan and 
controlled the domestic market. 
On the other hand, Yokohama Electric Wire Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (the predecessor of Furukawa 
Electric Co., Ltd.) and Goodrich Corporation of the United States jointly invested to established 
Yokohama Rubber Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (the predecessor of The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd.), and 
began its production of tires in 1921. 
The business of Yokohama Rubber Manufacturing was interrupted by the Great Kanto Earthquake 
in 1923, but its Yokohama factory was rebuilt, and production of domestic tires started in 1930. 
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Strong opposition was raised from inside and outside of the company on Ishibashi's plan to enter 
the tire business. However, Professor Takeo Kimijima of Kyushu University and Takuma Dan, 
president of Mitsui Godo Company , who knew Ishibashi through the tabi business, supported 
Ishibashi's plan. After examining the technical and cost challenges, Kimijima, a rubber research expert,  
suggested that tire manufacturing was possible. 
In 1929, Ishibashi ordered a tire manufacturing machine with a production capacity of 300 tires a 
day, and set up a tire factory in a corner of the Kurume factory of Nippon Tabi. The following year, 
Shojiro Ishibashi became the president of Nippon Tabi to replace his brother Tokujiro, and declared 
his plan to enter into the automobile tire business. In April 1930, after various technical issues were 
overcome, a prototype of an automobile tire was completed. The biggest challenge was ensuring 
quality. Since there were no tire specialists in Nippon Tabi, they tried to improve the quality by 
scouting Japanese engineers from Dunlop Far East Co., Ltd. 
In 1931, Bridgestone Tire Co., Ltd. was established, and Shojiro Ishibashi became president. The 
new company was established with a capital of 1 million yen, jointly funded by Shojiro and his brother 
Tokujiro. The investment ratio was 66% for Shojiro and 34% for Tokujiro. At that time, imported cars 
accounted for most of passenger cars and trucks in Japan, and the brand power of foreign products 
was overwhelming. Car tires were in a similar situation. In addition to reducing the quality gap with 
imported tires, the company was also required to eliminate the image of tires manufactured by tabi 
maker. 
Ishibashi thought that in order for Bridgestone, a follower, to compete with first movers such as 
Dunlop and Yokohama Rubber, it was imperative for Bridgestone to gain customer trust for its 
products. Therefore, a new system called liability guarantee system was introduced. This is a 
mechanism for unconditionally replacing tires when a complaint occurs. Many customers abused the 
system and the losses were not small, but Ishibashi endured. 
In 1932, Bridgestone tire products were recognized as excellent domestic products by the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry. Starting with being recognized as a qualifying product by Ford Japan, 
Japan General Motors and Chrysler successively adopted Bridgestone tires as genuine tires. The entry 
of Bridgestone tires created price competition, forcing foreign manufacturers, which used to dominate 
the domestic market, to cut prices. As a result, the price of tires dropped sharply, bringing great benefits 
to consumers. 
 
3.2 Bridgestone management during the war  
In 1937, Bridgestone Tire moved its headquarters from Kurume to Tokyo. At that time, Bridgestone 
tires had a problem of securing natural rubber, the raw material for manufacturing tires. In the midst 
of the wartime block economy, natural rubber production in Southeast Asia was dominated by Britain 
and the Netherlands. Ishibashi planned to develop synthetic rubber instead of natural rubber and use 
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it as a raw material for automobile tires. In 1938, rubber distribution control regulations were 
promulgated and securing natural rubber was even more difficult. In 1941, Bridgestone Tire 
successfully commercialized synthetic rubber and named it BS Rubber. 
 In 1939, production quotas and distribution controls for tires and tubes for private vehicles were 
enforced. In response, Bridgestone tires (shares 27-28%), Dunlop (shares 42%), and Yokohama 
Rubber (shares 32-33%) agreed to evenly divide the market share by 1/3. Also, agreements on sales 
territories was concluded (Ibid., P. 158). 
Under this agreement, Bridgestone tires’ area of business was determined as from Kyushu to part 
of Kansai (around Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe). In 1942, the name of the company was changed from 
Bridgestone Tires to Nippon Tires as the military pointed out that the company name Bridgestone was 
not appropriate as it was described in English, the language of enemy countries. 
In 1944, Nippon Tires was designated as a munitions company. In addition to automobile tires, 
Nippon Tire also produced aircraft tires, anti-vibration rubber, solid tires for tanks and bulletproof 
tanks. The Army and Navy fought a fierce battle for these products. 
 
4. Regeneration of Bridgestone and technological innovation 
 Immediately after the end of the war, Ishibashi came to realize that car tire production was a social 
mission as it was vitally important for the country to improve the means of transportation to speed up 
post-war reconstruction. At the Kurume plant, which survived the war, car tire production resumed 
just two months after the end of the war. 
 In 1951, Ishibashi changed the company name from "Nippon Tire" to "Bridgestone Tire" again. In 
the same year, Bridgestone Tire entered into a production and technical alliance with Goodyear, the 
world's top tire manufacturer. During World War II, Ishibashi was entrusted with the management of 
Goodyear's Java plant, which was requisitioned by the Japanese army, but after the war, he returned it 
to Goodyear intact. This deepened the bond between the two companies. 
 The details of the alliance with Goodyear were as follows (Bridgestone [1982], pp. 156-157). 
(1) Goodyear would provide technical guidance to Bridgestone tires, while Bridgestone tires pay 
technical guidance fees. 
(2) Bridgestone tires provide Goodyear with a portion of their production capacity, and produce 
Goodyear brand products, and Goodyear pays production costs. 
In the final stages of the partnership negotiations, Goodyear requested that it would take a 25% 
equity stake in Bridgestone. During this period, many Japanese companies were willing to accept 
foreign capital, but Ishibashi refused this request. He wanted to protect the management independence 
of Bridgestone. Eventually, the partnership was formed, as Goodyear withdrew its request for equity 
participation. This partnership enabled Ishibashi to absorb the latest tire manufacturing technology 
using rayon cords. 
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The cord constitutes the skeleton of the tire, and has the role of maintaining the internal air pressure 
from the load and impact the tire receives. When tire cords were developed in the 1920s, Egyptian 
cotton was used. After that, rayon was used in 1937, nylon in 1942, and polyester in 1962, to improve 
strength and product life (Hayashi [2009], p.157). 
Tires Bridgestone produced at that time were cotton cord tires, but this product was already 
discontinued in the United States. Ishibashi was clearly aware of the technical gap and recognized that 
innovation and improving production efficiency were urgent issues for Bridgestone to address. 
After World War II, the Japanese tire industry recovered its 
production level, supported by special demand from the Korean War. 
However, after the end of the Korean War, the domestic economy 
became deflationary and the tire industry suffered a sharp decline in 
demand. Under these circumstances, Bridgestone started a five-year 
plan to modernize production facilities in 1951, and Ishibashi ordered 
the development of rayon tires. Rayon tires were superior in cost and 




The production of rayon tires in full scale began in September 1951. In May of the following year, 
80% of Bridgestone tires were replaced with rayon tires. When the rayon tires were on track, Ishibashi 
ordered the development of tires that use nylon cords instead of rayon. In 1956, prototypes of nylon 
tires for trucks and buses were completed, and mass production was decided based on the results of 
test sales 
However, a big challenge was the procurement of raw nylon yarn. Nylon yarn production for tire 
manufacturers was dominated by DuPont. Ishibashi conducted joint research with Toyo Rayon Co., 
Ltd. to avoid dependence on foreign companies in terms of cost and stable supply, and eventually 
achieved domestic procurement of nylon raw yarn (Bridgestone [1982], pp. 215-216). 
Nylon tires had many advantages such as 1) heavy load resistance, 2) shock resistance, 3) fatigue 
resistance, 4) resistance for temperature rise, 5) water resistance, and 6) improved fuel efficiency by 
light weight. Therefore, it quickly attracted many customers. Bridgestone's technological innovation 
Table 2 Trend in purchases of tire cord yarn 
（Unit：t）
Year Nylon Rayon Nylon ratio
1958 49 4,410 1.1%
1959 403 6,735 5.6%
1960 1,210 6,644 15.4%
1961 3,507 5,424 39.3%
1962 4,811 5,753 45.5%
(Source) Bridgestone Corporation [1983] p.219
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and modernization of production facilities were successful, and in 1953 its sales exceeded 10 billion 
yen, jumping to the top in the industry. 
 
5. Outcomes of business diversification 
5.1 Challenges and setbacks in automotive development 
 Ishibashi, who became the manager of the leading tire 
manufacturer, next planned to move into the automobile 
manufacturing business. In 1949, Ishibashi invested in Tokyo 
Electric Vehicle Co., Ltd. 
Tokyo Electric Vehicle was founded by employees of Tachikawa 
Aircraft, which once produced fighter aircraft during the war. They 
also worked on the development of electric vehicles. 
However, as fuel efficiency was improved, the advantage of 
electric vehicles was lost. 
Therefore, the company decided to switch to gasoline-powered 
vehicles, and commissioned the production of engines to Fuji Precision Industries, which was 
descended from Nakajima Aircraft. Ishibashi purchased the shares of Fuji Seimitsu Kogyo held by the 
Industrial Bank of Japan, aiming for integrated production of engines and bodies. He led management 
himself as chairman (Ibid, p.356-357). 
In 1949, Tokyo Electric Motor Company changed its name to Tama Motor. In 1951, Tama Motor 
completed a truck equipped with a gasoline engine developed by Fuji Precision Industries. The 
following year, the first gasoline passenger car, named Prince, was launched and gained popularity. 
That year, Tama Motors changed its name to Prince Motor Corporation. In 1953, in line with 
Ishibashi's intentions, Prince Motor Corporation and Fuji Precision Industries merged. As a result, an 
integrated automobile production system was realized. 
The cars produced by Prince Motors were renowned for their innovative style and advanced 
technology. However, Prince Motors had no mass-market compact car in its product lineup, which 
was at the core of motorization in Japan. In addition, the company's corporate culture of seeking 
technical breakthroughs without being conscious about the development costs had a negative impact 
on Prince Motors’ business performance. 
Under these circumstances, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which wanted 
to strengthen the base of domestic automakers in preparation for liberalization of imported cars, urged 
the merger of Prince Motor and Nissan Motor (Ibid, p.358). 
In 1965, Ishibashi accepted the merger of Prince Motor Company and Nissan. Apart from 
Ishibashi’s  personal thoughts, his judgment as an entrepreneur, based on his deep insight into the 
domestic and international economic situation, seem to have influenced his decision to withdraw from 
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the automobile manufacturing business. 
 
5.2 Withdraw from motorcycle business 
 After the war, Ishibashi started production of bicycles at the Asahi Plant (Tosu City, Saga Prefecture).  
In 1949, Ishibashi spun off its Asahi Plant as Bridgestone Bicycle Co., Ltd., but there was a large 
technical gap in bicycle manufacturing capability from leading manufacturers such as Yamaguchi 
Bicycle, Miyata Kogyo, and Maruishi Bicycle. In addition, Recession due to the Dodge Line policy3 
deteriorated the company’s business performance. 
In 1952, Bridgestone Bicycle released the motor-driven bicycle 
"Bamby". The engine was developed by Fuji Precision Industries, 
which Ishibashi acquired for automobile manufacturing. The Bamby 
grew rapidly, improving its quality and gaining 52% market share in 
1952. But then, with the advent of the motorcycle age, small 
motorcycles fell into a slump (Bridgestone [1982], p.195). Bridgestone 
bicycles, who had no experience in full-scale motorcycle production, 
sought a way via  mopeds (motorcycles with pedals). However, with the spread of motorcycles, 
mopeds were already obsolete. In addition, the company's sales remained sluggish due to a lack of 
brand power and technical gaps with leading manufacturers. 
At that time, the motorcycle market in Japan was oligopolized by Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Suzuki 
Motor Co., Ltd. and Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., and their combined share increased from 67.8% (1960) 
to 92.3% (1966) (Small Car Newspaper [1958], pp. 16-21). In contrast, the Bridgestone cycle's share 
only increased slightly from 2.1% to 3.4%. With the oligopolistic status of the top three companies 
completed in the motorcycle market, Bridgestone lost its meaning in continuing its motorcycle 
business. In 1966, Ishibashi decided to withdraw from the motorcycle business. 
 
6. Out from family business and modernization of management 
In October 1961, Bridgestone went public on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges. Though a 
bank encouraged Ishibashi to list Bridgestone’s shares, he was reluctant about listing. However, the 
rapidly expanding business created strong financing needs. In addition, Bridgestone became a large 
company and was required to take responsibility as a public institution. Therefore, Ishibashi decided 
to go public in response to changes in the environment surrounding the company. 
Prior to Bridgestone's listing, Ishibashi gave Bridgestone shares at a lower price to qualified 
employees (approximately 9% of all employees). This not only served as securing stable shareholders, 
but also aimed at fostering a sense of unity between employees and the company (Bridgestone [1982], 
pp. 282-283). 
In 1963, when he was 74 years old, Ishibashi transferred the position as president to his son 
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Mikiichiro, and he became chairman. He continued to exert strong leadership until 1973 when he 
retired due to illness. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The Japanese automobile tire industry has been steadily growing since the 1960s with the progress 
of motorization and the growth of the Japanese economy. Even after the bursting of the bubble 
economy in the early 1900's, the industry has captured global demand in the United States, Europe 
and emerging markets, and their business performances have been generally strong. 
In 2005, Bridgestone surpassed Michelin in sales-based market share and became the world's 
number one tire manufacturer. Until now, it has maintained the leading position in the industry. The 
major tire manufacturers' market shares in FY2016 were Bridgestone (14.6%), Michelin (14.0%) and 
Goodyear (9.0%). 
The characteristics of Shojiro Ishibashi as an entrepreneur can be summarized in the following three 
points. The first is excellent self-innovation ability. He solidified his business base with the success of 
the tabi business, but he didn’t stick to his successful experience. Instead, he constantly challenged 
new fields. Top management's self-innovation fostered a self-reliant organization that produced 
continuous innovation and achieved spiral growth. 
The second point is the effective use of knowledge. In taking on the challenge of developing 
automotive tires, Bridgestone made the most of its knowledge of rubber processing technology.    
With the leadership of Ishibashi and his support, this diversion of technical knowledge was actively 
explored in Bridgestone and led to new businesses. 
The third point is outside-in thinking. Outside-in thinking is an indispensable ability to create 
innovations that respond to social needs. Ishibashi captured the social needs of the domestic production 
of automobile tires and succeeded in capturing it as a business opportunity. It can be said that he 
practiced management that anticipated CSV (Creating Shared Value) proposed by M. Porter in 2010. 
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1 In the early Meiji period, sen was used as the secondary currency unit. 1 yen was 100 sen, so 20 sen was one fifth 
of 1 yen. 
2 UNIQLO is a casual wear brand operated by Fast Retailing Co., Ltd in Japan. The official name is UNIQUE 
CLOTHING WAREHOUSE. UNIQLO has gained the support of customers around the world as a brand of high 
quality and reasonable price for all ages and genders. 
3 The Dodge Line was a fiscal and monetary tightening policy implemented by the Allies in February 1949 for the 
independence and stability of the Japanese economy. Inflation subsided due to this policy, but deflation progressed, 
and unemployment and bankruptcy increased. 
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